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ABSTRACT- Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC) allows 
parties with similar background to compute results upon 
their private data, minimizing the threat of disclosure. The 
exponential increase in sensitive data that needs to be passed 
upon networked computers and the stupendous growth of 
internet has precipitated vast opportunities for cooperative 
computation, where parties come together to facilitate 
computations and draw out conclusions that are mutually 
beneficial; at the same time aspiring to keep their private 
data secure. These computations are generally required to be 
done between competitors, who are obviously weary of each-
others intentions. SMC caters not only to the needs of such 
parties but also provides plausible solutions to individual 
organizations for problems like privacy-preserving database 
query, privacy-preserving scientific computations, privacy-
preserving intrusion detection and privacy-preserving data 
mining. This paper is an extension to a previously proposed 
protocol Encrytpo_Random, which presented a plain sailing 
yet effective approach to SMC and also put forward an aptly 
crafted architecture, whereby such an efficient protocol, 
involving the parties that have come forward for joint-
computations and the third party who undertakes such 
computations, can be developed. Through this extended 
work an attempt has been made to further strengthen the 
existing protocol thus paving the way for a more secure 
multi-party computational process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The SMC has been a problem that has attracted the 
attention of scholars and the industry for quite some time. 
Although a vast amount of work has been done upon the 
subject, the perpetual implementation of the endeavors has 
only yielded a perennial hornet’s nest. Having said that, it 
should be acknowledged that to compute results upon data 
whose source is not known is not child’s play; and the 
works undertaken until now have served a great purpose 
in enlightening the industry of the subtleties of this so-
called SMC problem. 
Thus motivated with the intention of solving this 
SMC problem we proposed a new protocol 
Encrytpo_Random through which we had put forward 
what we perceived, to be the most appropriate and 
seemingly plausible solution to the SMC conundrum. The 
methodology followed was quite elementary yet very 
comprehensible. Encrytpo_Random worked on a two 
layer basis; it consisted of the parties (1st layer) who 
aspire to draw out a result collectively and being 
apprehensive of each-others intentions appoint an 
assumedly unbiased third party (2nd layer) to carry out the 
computation and announce the result. 
In Extended Encrytpo_Random the domain of the 
2nd layer has been extended from a single third-party to 
multiple third-parties, from whom a single entity is chosen 
at run time and given the responsibility of performing the 
required computation. A proposal sounds overtly 
hyperbolic without a thorough layout of the architecture to 
aptly implement it. Thus, here we also present a 
meticulously worked-out architecture to realize the 
protocols and also to showcase and answer the pertinent 
queries that are bound to arise in the minds of the 
audience. 
 The modus-operandi of the protocol deters the 
bodies involved to exhibit any malicious conduct by 
presenting thoroughly planned impediments in the path of 
the transfer of data among themselves. The security of 
information of the parties is of utmost importance in any 
approach seeking to solve the SMC enigma. In our 
protocols we have taken adequate precautions so as to 
guarantee the security of data of the involved parties. 
Instead of sending the entire data blocks the parties break 
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them into packets and randomly distribute amongst 
themselves, for a stipulated number of times. Provisions 
have been done so as to ensure that the parties do not get 
to know whose data packets they are forwarding, and in 
stark contrast, the third party also doesn’t have even a 
Lilliputian hint as to whose data packet a particular party 
is sending. This necessitates the need of a secure channel 
to transfer the data packets which have been dealt with in 
the deftly formed and apposite architecture.  To further 
conceal the identity of the data packets we apply an 
encrypting function upon the data packets; these 
encrypting functions also reach to the third party through 
the same path and are used to decode the packets and 
rearrange them to form data blocks. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
The SMC came to the fore-front as the Millionaires 
problem described by Yao in [8]. U.Maurer considered the 
general SMC protocols [7]. For specific tasks like online 
auctions, public voting or online updating of the data there 
exist very efficient and effective protocols. General SMC 
protocols are less effective than special purpose protocols. 
Maurer also defined the different types of security in 
databases [5]. Privacy preserving data mining using SMC 
has great importance and many applications have been 
developed [9, 14]. Du et al. reviewed the various 
industrial problems and listed them in [1, 3]. Some of the 
existing protocols are in the form of the circuit evaluation 
protocols, and encryption with homomorphism schemes.
 The first general constant round protocol for 
secure two-party computations was given by Yao [16]. 
Yao’s original protocol considered only the case of semi-
honest parties. An extension to the case of malicious party 
was given by Lindell [17]. Goldreich et al. showed the 
existence of a secure solution of SMC problem [6]. The 
size of such protocols depend upon the number of parties 
involved in the computation process.  
A new concept was put forward by D.K.Mishra 
and M.Chandwani [18] through their multi-layer 
protocols. Initially a two-layer protocol along with a 
tentative architecture for its implementation was 
proposed. This two-layer protocol was improvised by a 
three-layer protocol in which an anonymizer layer was 
added in between the participating parties and the third 
party. This new layer hid the information of the parties 
from the third party, who computes the data and provides 
the result. In the next paper [19], this three-layer protocol, 
was further extended into a four-layer protocol in which a 
packet layer was introduced. This new concept provided 
security to the data from most of the malicious activity, 
even if the third party is not a trusted one. 
             The magnanimity and the complexity of this 
protocol present an unusual paradox. On one hand owing 
to its compounded and uncanny nature, this protocol 
prevents most of the unscrupulous activities; but on the 
other hand, its intricate technicalities make it very difficult 
to actually implement it. Another disadvantage of this 
protocol is that, the anonymzier-layer has been assumed to 
be incorruptible; if in case it becomes malicious then 
many an information leak can occur. 
To solve such problems we proposed a new 
protocol Encrytpo_Random[20], which involved only two 
layers: 1st Layer consisted of the parties that wish to 
compute results and the 2nd Layer made of the Trusted 
Third Party (TTP), that which computes the result for 
these parties. Here we are putting forward an extension 
with the aim of further strengthening the existing protocol. 
We consider the third party as a trusted one on account 
that it computes the results correctly. 
 
3. INFORMAL DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Encrypto_Random 
The previous attempts done to solve the SMC problem 
were either too simple or gullible in their outlook that it 
was quite easy for the various parties involved in the 
process of computation to leak the data; or were too 
complicated to be realized in the real world. 
Our protocols dare to rectify the fallacies of these 
preceding works by proposing a new scheme for solving 
the SMC problem. The main aspect of SMC is the 
computation of data in a secure and private manner. Thus 
the handling of the data is the major concern. Keeping this 
vital point of the SMC in mind, we put forward a simple 
but effective two-layer protocol. The layout of our 
protocol is straight forward, which makes is easy to 
implement; but we have put various checks at subsequent 
levels so as to ensure the security of the data of the 
incumbent parties. Encrypto_Random works on the simple 
technique that ‘n’ number of parties decide to coordinate, 
and thus need to put forward their data; obviously aspiring 
not to give undue advantage to their competitors by 
revealing their information. Thus they appoint a third 
party to compute upon their collective data and announce 
the result publicly. 
 Encrypto_Random exhibits two-layer 
architecture, activation of each layer being an alternate 
phenomenon. At the 1st layer the Parties (who wish to 
perform the computations) are active while at the 2nd 
layer the Third Party (who computes the result for the 
parties) is active. The parties break their data blocks into 
packets (number of packets formed by each party is fixed, 
as decided by the TTP). Then an encrypting function is 
used by each party to encode their data packets. This 
encrypting function is drawn out randomly by each party 
from a pool maintained by the Third Party. These 
encrypted packets are then randomly sent to other 
participating parties. This random distribution is 
synchronized, and is realized by using a random function 
which can be initiated by any of the participating parties at 
run time. This process of random dissemination of the 
data packets is carried out many times; which further 
guarantees the confidentiality of the data blocks. After a 
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certain number of this parceling out, these data packets are 
then sent to the third party; who has the resources to store 
all the incoming data packets. The TTP then decodes the 
received data packets by using the pool of encrypting 
functions maintained by it, consequently re-arranging 
them into whole data blocks. Now the computations are 
carried out as per the collective requirements of the parties 
and the result is announced publicly. 
 
3.2 Extended Encrypto_Random 
Encrypto_Random gives an efficient and secure way of 
carrying out multi-party computations. Requisite measures 
were taken to check the flow of data. But still a certain 
amount of hesitancy creeps into the mind of the observer 
that too much of information is being leveraged upon the 
TTP. To take care of such doubts we here propose an 
extension to our existing work, wherein the computational 
layer consists of not one but multiple third parties. One out 
of these many TTP is chosen at run time, and all data 
packets are then forwarded by the parties on the 1st layer 
to this TTP. This TTP then rearranges the data packets into 
data blocks and consequentially calculates and announces 
the result. Choice of the TTP is done on a random basis 
and is undertaken by another randomization function, in-
built in the architecture of the protocol. 
As the TTP is not predetermined and is unknown 
until the time of the computation, this decreases the 
possibility of a joint malicious conduct by the parties and 
the TTP. Also, since most of the activities take place at 
run-time, it guarantees against any sort of unscrupulous 
activities (joint or individual) by the various entities as 
well. The encrypting functions are selected from a pool 
maintained by each TTP, thus the parties does not 
individually need to intimate the TTP as to which function 
they have used. The data packets are distributed randomly 
amongst the parties, that too a number of times, because as 
when the parties will forward the data it will be a 
combination of various packets and thus the identity is 
hidden. 
Here special care has been taken to keep the 
process very straight-forward for the parties. The chosen 
TTP however has to undertake a lot of efforts to decrypt 
the data packets and to rearrange them back into whole 
data blocks. But this is just a small price to pay for 
maintaining the secrecy of information, which is of utmost 
importance for every organization. 
 
4. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions have been stipulated:  
1. TTP computes the result from the data provided 
to it by the parties. 
2. It will do so by using a function, for which it will 
bring into effect a function generator. 
3. TTP has the ability to announce the result of the 
computation publicly, although this won’t be 
desirable in most of the cases. 
4. Each party having an input can communicate 
with a trusted network connection. 
5. The communication channels used by the input 
providing parties to communicate with the third 
party are secure. This implies that no intruder can 
intercept the data transferred between them. 
6. The function given to the domain of the parties 
are not same, they are different. 
7. Minimum three parties should be involved in the 
SMC. 
8. The number of packets generated by each party is 
the same, as decided by the TTP. 
9. The packet sizes of the parties are equal, as 
decided by the TTP. 
10. The TTP has the resources to store all the 
incoming data packets and the encoded 
functions. 
 
5. ARCHITECTURE 
5.1 Encrypto_Random: 
 
 
       
Figure 1.   The Existing Architecture 
Figure 1 depicts the simple architecture of 
Encrypto_Random. According to this the 1st layer i.e. The 
Input Layer comprise of all the parties that are involved in 
the computation process. Since all these parties are inter-
connected, the data packets of the respective parties are 
randomly distributed amongst them, for a stipulated 
number of times. Thus when the parties forward the data 
packets, the Third Party receives the data packets that 
belong to some other party rather than the one who has 
forwarded them. This ensures that the identity of the 
parties is hidden in terms of which data packets belong to 
them. 
 The Third Party exists at the 2nd layer, i.e. The 
Computation Layer, where the computations are carried 
out. After receiving the data packets from the parties (at 
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layer 1), the data packets are re-arranged by the Third 
Party using the Pool of Functions. Once the data packets 
are reassembled the computation is carried out and the 
result is obtained. It seems to be a simple architecture but 
provides various checks keeping in mind the fulfillment of 
the all the constraints of the SMC.   
 
5.2 Extended Encrypto_Random: 
 
                   Figure 2.   The Proposed Architecture 
Figure 2 depicts the extended architecture of our protocol. 
Instead of a single TTP, the computational layer (2nd 
layer) consists of a pool of TTP. Each TTP has the same 
pool of functions, which were used previously by the 
parties (1st layer) to encrypt their data packets. One out 
these many TTP is chosen at run time and all data packets 
are forwarded to it making it responsible for the regrouping 
of data packets into data blocks and the subsequent 
required calculations. 
 
6. FORMAL DESCRIPTION 
Extended Encrypto_Random 
The extended protocol, like its predecessor, is based on 
the simple pretext of a group of parties (P1, P2…Pn) who 
assign the task of computation to a TTP. Each party Pn 
breaks its data block into number of packets (PnKr) and 
applies encrypting function (f1, f2…fn) chosen from the 
pool of functions (D). This breaking of the data blocks 
into packets and the application of the encrypting 
functions is facilitated by the already existing provisions 
deftly incorporated in the architecture of the protocol. 
These encrypted packets (Snr= PnKr + VrFn) are randomly 
distributed among parties. A TTP is chosen at run time 
using randomization function (Rf). All data is sent to this 
TTP, who then decodes the data packets, rearranges them 
into whole data blocks; computes and announces the result 
publicly. 
Algorithm Extended Encrypto_Random:  
1. Define P1,P2, …, Pn  as parties; 
2. Define D as function pool; 
3. Define F1,F2,…, Fn as encrypting functions; 
4. For party P1 to Pn do  
begin 
Break data block into packets;  
(PnK1, PnK2 … PnKr) 
/* Where K1, K2 …Kr 
designate the packets of a party 
*/ 
Select function from pool (D); 
Attach encrypting value of function to 
each packet; 
Compute Snr = PnKr + VrFn;  
/* Where V1, V2, …,Vr are the 
values of function Fn)*/ 
end; 
5. For r=1 to s, do 
begin  
Send Snr randomly to Pn; 
end; 
6. Repeat step 5 for n times. 
7. Select TTP using Rf. 
8. For P1 to Pn , do 
begin  
Send Snr to TTP; 
end; 
9. TTP decodes Snr using Fn from D; and rearrange 
PnKr into data blocks; 
10. TTP computes and announces result; 
 
7. ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE 
Extended Encrypto_Random 
Case 1: Joint malicious conduct by certain Parties. 
The parties receive the data packets PnKr and the function 
value VrFn. At a given instant, if m number of parties get 
together, they will have the following information at their 
disposal: 1). m*Xr number of packets, (Xr = number of 
packets generated by a single party, as fixed by the TTP) 
and 2). m number of encrypting functions. This 
information is useless for them, because they won’t be 
having the encrypting functions of the other parties for 
generating the whole blocks of data. Moreover it is highly 
improbable that these m parties receive all the packets of a 
certain party, thus making the available information with 
them redundant. 
Case 2: The chosen TTP becomes malicious. 
The TTP receives the packets PnKr and the function value 
VrFn. Also, it has the pool of random functions. At a given 
instant it has the set (PnKr, VrFn, pool of functions). The 
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TTP can assemble the data packets to form whole data 
blocks, but in no case can relate any data block thus 
formed to a certain party. Further, if there are a large 
number of participating parties (which can be assumed to 
be the real world scenario, and for which our protocol is 
sincerely aimed at), then it becomes nearly impossible to 
decisively relate a particular data block to a particular 
party. This is also evident by the probabilistic curve, which 
describes an inversely parabolic path and tends to 0 as the 
number of parties increases. 
Case 3: Joint malicious conduct by some Party and the 
TTP. 
In the previous protocol there was a predetermined TTP, 
thus there was plausibility about some party goading the 
TTP to exhibit corrupt behavior, and consequently give 
undue advantage to such a party by revealing the 
regrouped data blocks. This problem is taken care of in this 
extended work, as the TTP is decided only at run time by 
the protocol. Thus it becomes virtually impossible for any 
party motivated by vindictive intent to collaborate with the 
unknown TTP for a joint malicious conduct. 
 
8. PROBABILISTIC EVIDENCE 
Let P(xn) be the probability that a party turns malicious, 
where n is the number of parties. 
Thus, P(x1) = P(x2) = P(x3) = P(x4) = . . . =P(xn) = 1/n 
(equal for all parties).  
 
If at a given instant, a party Pr (say) intends to leak the 
information of the other parties. The probability of the 
number of packets that party can decrypt is given by 
 = number of packets of that party / total number of 
packets. 
= Xr / (r=1∑n Xr) 
 
Therefore, probability that one party exhibits malicious 
conduct  
= [1/n] * [Xr / (r=1∑n Xr)] 
 
Now let’s say r number of parties become malicious.  
Thus, Probability for leak of the packets  
= [r/n] * [r=1∑r Xr)/ (r=1∑n Xr]  
 
Also, let P(tm) be the probability that the chosen TTP turns 
malicious, where m is the number of total TTP out of 
which one will be chosen. 
Thus, P(t1) = P(t2) = P(t3) = P(t4) = . . . =P(tm) = 1/m 
(equal for all TTP).  
 
Therefore, Total Probability for leak of the packets is 
given by 
= 1/m * [r/n] * [r=1∑r Xr)/ (r=1∑n Xr] 
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Figure 3.   Total Probability for Leak of Data 
 
n = number of parties coming together for joint 
computation. 
m = number of TTP from which one is chosen. 
Xr = 4, fixed number of packets made by each of these n 
parties (as decided by the TTP). Here has been taken as 
example to construct the graph. 
m = 4, fixed number of TTP taken as example to illustrate 
the graph.  
Let’s say that one party out of n decides to decrypt its data 
packets. Thus, probability that it becomes successful in 
exhibiting such malicious conduct is given by: (1/m * 
1/n2). 
 
This curve depicts an inversely hyperbolic path and 
substantially proves that, as the number of participating 
parties increases, the probability of malicious conducts 
and the subsequent leakage of data decreases, and 
ultimately tends to zero if the number of parties are 
numerous. 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
Secure Multi-Party Computation is a well researched 
topic. Quite a few protocols already exist, and work is 
going-on on another handful. Through Extended 
Encrypto_Random we have endeavored to present a 
concept that emphasizes the need to keep the structure of 
the proposed solution to the problem very forthright so as 
to avoid ambiguities; at the same time ensuring the 
security of information by taking efficient and intricate 
measures. The data is first distributed and then sent 
forward; assuring that no party becomes victim to 
sabotage by other parties and also that, no party gets 
undue privilege, as the sole responsibility of the 
computation process is not vested upon a single entity. 
The encrypted nature of data further hinders any 
possibility of spiteful conduct. The possibility of 
collaborative malefic behavior by some party and the TTP 
has been completely curbed by concealing the identity of 
the TTP until runtime. Our protocol also reduces the 
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complexities that are encountered in three and four layer 
protocols.  
 
10.  FUTURE SCOPE 
The function domain is being further developed and the 
transforming functions that leverage the proposed 
architecture in different areas are being fine-tuned. 
Subsequent enhancement of the protocol is expected in the 
sense that instead of making a single TTP responsible for 
calculating the result, multiple TTP are given the same set 
of data packets, upon which each of them will perform the 
same computations. Then the results of each of them are 
compared to decide which of them are harmonious. If 
more than half of the results are found synonymous, then 
such a result can be authenticated.  
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